Unconnected to A330 problems of late? Maybe, maybe not; I think not. The FADECs are integrated into the ADIRU’s (aircraft computers) that control every aspect of flight. In the recent control excursions the pitot system has been blamed (AF, NWA, etc) and in the case of the QANTAS excursions the angle of attack system (AOA). Now we get FADEC (duel, very unlikely) failures. There is not a single point of failure; unless you dig a bit deeper and analyze where the information is processed and acted upon. The ADIRU #1. How is engine thrust related? If the ADIRU senses the aircraft approaching stall; taking input from speed (pitot) or angle of attack the engines will be directed to over-ride the pilot and run power up and if the AOA spikes the flight controls will be directed to push negative g. Ah Ha!

Remember the engines on Sully’s A320 would have still produced thrust, probably allowing him to reach an airfield. However the FADECs over-rode the crew and shut them down. Humans are smarter than computers, they understand the unquantifiable; for example it is better to burn engines up then go for a swim.

Back in the day, when we fought an F-16 slow we didn’t fight the aircraft (we’d loose) we fought the computer. It would over-ride the pilot exposing him to a guns shot. The FA-18 was different (also fly-by-wire); if you wanted to fly zero airspeed it would let you, the pilot had the over-all control. Not that I haven’t witnessed a fight for control between an ex A-7 pilot and his brand new F-18 (Hornet does a hands off catapult launch) off the cat. However, in general the Navy wanted the pilot to be the final arbiter. Personally I agree.

I have read accounts saying that the Polish President had in the past ordered the crew to attempt to land. Still, it was the Aircraft Commander who made the decision to try another landing instead of diverting.

Could a mechanical problem have added to the accident? Certainly. The causal factor, in my opinion, will be descending below the minimum altitude for the instrument landing being flown. Simply: the crew exceeded the aircraft and airfield’s minimum safe altitude for the foggy weather on approach.

The articles I have read blame the aircraft, airfield, even the President. However, none that I have read place the blame where it belongs. The crew should have diverted after going missed-approach multiple times. Instead, it appears they pressed the minimums and hit the trees. Even if the President had insisted they try again, upon reaching the minimum descent altitude unable to land safely, they should have diverted.

It is the hard decisions that may save your life. Ironically, you will never really know for sure. Can’t prove a negative.

I remember, years ago, flying an EA-6B from Cubi Point Naval Air Station (NAS) in the Philippine Islands to NAS Atsugi, Japan. We stopped for fuel in Okinawa and checked the weather: it was terrible in Atsugi. It was snowing and below non-precision approach minimums (it was above precision approach minimums 200-feet ceiling, 1/2 mile visibility).

The EA-6B Prowler did not have instruments for precision approaches; we were limited (except at the ship) to a ground-controlled approach (GCA). A GCA was an approach where a ground controller talked you down the glide slop and kept you on course via radio calls. Obviously, if you lost your radio, you were out of luck, so for safety reasons you had to be able to shoot a non-precision approach using the equipment on board as a backup.

The equipment was ancient technology, basically a needle (like on a compass) pointed to a radio station, and you would put the head of the needle on a specific inbound course descending off the clock or distance measuring equipment. It was not accurate, so the minimum altitude was usually 600-500 feet above the ground. BTW, that was above the runway area — you may be descending into a mountain valley or among buildings.

The EA-6B and other aircraft that had NFO’s (Naval Flight Officers) could complicate things because of command structure or rank. The Aircraft Commander could be the junior man by rank in the aircraft because he was the only pilot.

On this particular night, I was a Navy Lieutenant flying with three NFO’s, one of whom was the Commanding Officer of the Squadron, my boss.

Not only was the weather bad, it was a moonless night and we were late. We had flown a flight from the USS Midway, landed in Cubi Point in the Philippines, de-carrierized the aircraft (lowered the pressure in tires) and then launched to Okinawa.

Already a long day, we were tired and hungry when we landed in Okinawa. After I checked the weather in operations I told the crew we couldn’t go; Atsugi was below minimums. Since we were headed home to our families, after weeks at sea, we were all very disappointed. To further add to our disappointment was the fact we were only going to get two nights home. We would now spend one in Okinawa.

Our Commanding Officer, normally a stickler for the rules ,wanted to press. I was a push-it-to-the edge Attack Pilot, and had a beautiful wife and two cute little boys waiting for me. I had already landed zero/zero (zero visibility, zero ceiling) on the Midway more than once. However, there I had a precision CILS (Carrier Instrument Landing System) and a Landing Signal Officer (LSO) on deck, to keep me from hitting the ramp. In short, I had options and a good divert. If we lost our radio, we would be screwed going to Atsugi.

The Commanding Officer pressed (BTW, he was also the kind of guy who would stick it in your eye later for breaking the rules now.)  I held my ground,

“Skipper,” I said, “three legs; we are all tired and it is illegal. Let’s go to the Q (quarters) and hit it first thing in the morning.”

“Stand-by,” he snapped, and went to talk to the weather guessers. My other two crewman implored me to not let him kill us.

After a few minutes he returned triumphantly:

“I found a legal divert.”

It was an obscure Japanese Self Defense Force base in the mountains. None of us had ever flown there and it was just at non-precision approach minimums. As a bonus, it was at maximum-divert range; we would be trick-or-treat on arrival (land or flame out due to lack of fuel). Again, no options.

One of the very junior NFO’s couldn’t take it anymore.

“Skipper this is a bad idea.”

The other immediately agreed.

“Shantini and I will make the decision. You two are in the back!” he snapped in his best Command voice.

“No,” I said, “the decision is mine alone. I’m the Aircraft Commander, and I’m going to the Q.”

He was furious, but it was indeed my call. I was the only pilot.

The next day was beautiful all the way to Atsugi. The ice and snow-laden front had moved through. Our families were waiting as we landed; it was a joyous reunion.

The next afternoon, we sortied back to Cubi Point. Now that cooler heads prevailed, I thought he might give me a pat on the back for playing it safe and stopping the “get home-itis” (often fatal to Naval Aviators). Quite the opposite: he chided me in front of the crew, saying he checked and we could have made it. He then stomped off to the aircraft.

My fellow crewman were as stunned as I was.

“Man that guy is not only an idiot, he’s a jerk,” mumbled our newest Lieutenant Junior Grade.

Later, as we say in Naval Aviation, “I read about it”, on my Fitness as an Officer Report. No matter, I was alive. So was my crew, and my jet was in one piece.

Sometimes the hard decisions are not career-enhancing.

Each level of pilot certification comes with a raised performance level. Simply put; the further you progress, the higher the demonstrated skill level required to successfully complete the associated check ride. You are expected to fly better on your Commercial check ride then you did on your Private; the ultimate check and standard, is your ATP.

The initial proposal required that before you could fly as an airline pilot, you had to have proved you could fly to the standards of an airline pilot. Seemed logical; the flight schools, my own Alma Mata included, screamed bloody murder. Why? They knew that the last few students they had willing to go 100K into debt, to get a 20K a year job, would quit. Going from 190 hours to 1,500 would run the cost of being an airline pilot up exponentially. As always it is not about right or wrong, not even safety, it is about the money.

“Lives will be saved,” Senator Byron Dorgan, the North Dakota Democrat who heads the aviation subcommittee, said after the vote. “We really do advance the interests of pilot training and experience.”

No they really don’t; just an arbitrary number. In fact, the United States Navy determined years ago, after studying a history of aviation accidents, that the most UNSAFE pilots historically have between 800-1,000 hours. Ironic indeed!

You might be surprised that a North Dakota Senator is leading the charge (or capitulation depending on your view) of aviation experience. I’m not; the University of North Dakota has one of the largest flight schools in the USA. Some things never change, especially in congress.

The coming changes will affect the major airlines as well. Post 911 the airlines used the bankruptcy court to gut pilot contracts. Their biggest target bedsides pay was work rules. You reap what you sow; it showed first in the Regionals and now the Majors are showing the initial signs of safety concerns. A recent rash of near and actual accidents all seem to have one common factor; fatigue.

The entire industry has been relying on pilot experience to preserve safety in a fatigued profession. Fatigue is accumulative and it seems that the industry is on the edge. The FAA apparently is concerned enough to re-write decades old regulations on crew rest and training. Mr. Babbitt; the Administrator for the FAA, is pushing hard to get them in place by spring. It can’t come fast enough; with age 65 now in effect fatigue mitigation will become even more critical to airline safety. It is my opinion that fatigue is the number one causal factor in airline mishaps and accidents.

The new rules will cause a need for more QUALIFIED pilots. That will cause a shortage; because quite simply they are not there for the Regionals. You reap what you sow; no 20 year old in his or her right mind will run up 100 thousand dollars in loans for a 16 thousand dollar a year job. Once the majors pick through what’s left of their furlough pools they will find the same thing. No military pilot in his or her right mind is going to take a huge pay cut flying fighters, to come to an industry that issues pay cuts instead of raises and zeros out retirements instead of funding them.

So the Majors will pull from the Regionals, which will empty the Regionals, which will then cause the majors to have to pick up the flying of the Regionals, which will in turn collapse the Regionals and cause a shortage in the Majors as they expand to pick up the flying. Follow the bouncing ball.

About the time this is all sorted out, the vast majority of major airline pilots will time out and the industry 12-14 years from now will grind to a halt. IATA is already experiencing a shortage of experienced pilots worldwide (temporarily dampened by 911/SARs/and now the economy) and their solution is to simply do away with pilot qualifications via the Multi Pilot License. This will kick the problem down the road for a while; however MPL holders cannot be Captains. Once the last of the old guys retire, that will ground a significant portion of the airlines of the world. There will not be enough Captains, period. Fewer flights, much fewer; with bigger aircraft will become the only operationally sustainable model. Ironically it will save the industry economically, for those airlines that secure enough Captains to keep enough of their fleet in the air. Supply and demand, economics 101; but it is going to be hard and expensive to get from major city to major city. The secondary and tertiary markets can forget about air service.

You reap what you sow; the airline Transport Association has successfully smashed the unions and beat down the job to the pay level of a truck driver at the Majors and a McDonald’s worker at the Regionals. Flight schools are shuttering their doors; young college educated, smart hard chargers (the typical pilot profile) do not want the job anymore. It is not worth it; they are going to Wall Street, Med School or Law School now. If they want to fly they will buy their own airplane. Bottom line, you get what you pay for.

In the case of Flight 253, apparently we didn’t want to offend anyone.  The future terrorist of Flight 253 was turned in by his own father, a respected international  banker, as a danger to the USA.  But because he had not yet done an act of terrorism, no action was taken.  His visa was not pulled.

Then our terrorist decided to take a flight to the USA.  Apparently, the fact that he came from a country full of  terrorists currently in a civil war, fitting the profile of a terrorist, on a terrorist watch list, was not enough to get him a special screening.  You would have thought being on a terror watch list alone would be enough.  Especially after the warning, done in person by his father, to the U.S. Embassy.  No special screening was done.

It begs the question: if fitting the profile of a terrorist, coming from a nation full of terrorists, and being on a terrorist watch list, WITH a specific warning from a family member, does not get you a special screening, what does?

We are at war; just because some in this country don’t want it to be true doesn’t mean the Islamic terrorists will go away.  We know who our enemies are. Searching Granny is a joke.

The Australian Transportation Safety Board’s (ATSB) initial finding, on Qantas Flight 72’s A-330 incident, determined it was a false angle of attack input passed by ADIRU #1 to the primary flight computer that caused the subsequent loss of control and injuries.  ADIRU #1 would not automatically deselect, even after the flight crew switched the system to ADIRU#2.  It sent flawed inputs to the flight computer which caused the fly by wire system to overstress the airframe with spurious inputs.  Procedures were issued by the EASA and yet on a subsequent Qantas flight they failed to override ADIRU #1.  New procedures were then issued by the EASA to de-energize ADIRU #1 to prevent it from passing spurious data to the primary flight computer.   The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued two Emergency Airworthiness Directives (EAD) involving the ADIRU in December and January following the Qantas incidents.

In light of the ATSB’s findings and EASA issued procedures, I was totally confused by the focus on the pitot system after the Air France 447 accident.  The ATSB made it very clear that it was a separate system, the angle of attack system, which caused the QF 72 upset.  In short, it was my opinion that they were treating the symptom not the cause.  My opinion has not been swayed that it is the ADIRU #1 that is the common denominator in these incidents.  The recent problem with the Goodrich system seems to verify this.  Since it is apparent that the fix was not a fix; the question remains.  Is the A330 safe?

I’ve had endless questions on Northwest’s lost communication and over flight of Minneapolis.  After hearing yet another “expert” jabber incoherently on cable, I’ll try and clear a few things up.   First, it is not unusual for an aircraft to go “lost comm” with control centers.  Especially in the west where radios can stay quiet for a long time.  An aircraft can fly out of range of a frequency, the pilots can miss the frequency switch, a stuck microphone can in effect jam the frequency or an equipment failure can occur. 

What was unusual was the over flight.  That means the crew missed the visual and aural cues.  Why?  At this point it is speculation; however the profile is similar to the GO flight in Hawaii, where the NTSB determined the crew fell asleep due to fatigue.   Fatigue is not limited to just falling asleep.  A general loss of SA (situational awareness) also is symptomatic of fatigue.  As the Delta flight that landed on a taxiway showed last week, it surfaces when things do not go according to plan.  An in flight emergency, frequency change, any distraction can cause a loss of SA to a fatigued crew. 

Standard industry contracts allowed airline crews to fly no more than a hard 75 hours ten or fifteen years ago.  After 911 most contracts were ravaged in bankruptcy proceedings, allowing crews at some airlines to go to 100 flight hours a month.  Factor in the average age of the cockpit crew and fatigue becomes a real concern.  Soon the major airlines will have more pilots in their 60’s than in their 40’s.  There are virtually no pilots in their 20’s anymore and only a handful in their 30’s at most legacy carriers.  In short you have a pilot group that is easier to fatigue, due to age, flying more hours a month than crews have flown in generations.

The runway where the jet was supposed to land, and the small taxiway next to it

Here is why it could have been tragic.  Runway 27R is the central runway to ATL’s 5 parallel runways with 3 parallel taxiways.  Two north, M and L and one south N; these taxiways are normally stacked with aircraft waiting to cross the numerous runways.  I sat for quite a few minutes on all three taxiways last week.  What a conflagration this could have been. 

The crew of Flight 60 had just flown a 10-hour, “all nighter” from Rio.  They had an onboard medical emergency.  I suspect that is why they were assigned the inboard runway, which is normally the takeoff runway.  There is a lot of distraction with a medical emergency. 

Fatigue shows when the normal routine gets disrupted.  I’ll say it again; fatigue shows when the normal routine gets disrupted.  This could very easily have been the worst disaster in aviation history.  All night, 10-hour flight–do you think fatigue played a part?

The NTSB investigation of the Buffalo incident sparked this debate, making it clear: There was nothing wrong with the aircraft that crashed in Buffalo; the crew was fatigued, not properly trained, had a record of past check ride failures (Captain) and in the case of the first Officer, paid less than a McDonald’s employee. Look at the picture–that is the result and it is a harsh one. It is also the reality of aviation. If you make a big mistake, people die.

When I was an instructor in the A-4 Skyhawk, we got a new Wing Commander that did not believe in attriting (washing out) weak pilots. Give them extra training and bring them up to speed was the new mantra. There were many happy hour discussions among the incredulous instructors–the consensus? There will be attrition, natural or otherwise. Within a few short month, three former students flew perfectly good, multi-million dollar aircraft into the ground or water. Even after the hardest and most intense flight training in the world. And let’s be clear: once winged, a new Naval Aviator is told to “shut up and join up.” A new guy is put on an old guy’s wing to keep him out of trouble and learn. Unfortunately, there are some functions that a Naval Aviator must perform on their own: getting on board the lead’s wing, delivering their bombs, and landing on the ship. These are the operations the young men died while trying to perform. That is not to say that new guys don’t struggle; most do and are brought up to speed at a pace they can hack. If that pace is not acceptable to the Navy, they are sent home. They do not lead air strikes or get put into a test cockpit out of the Training Command.

In the past, civilian pilots gained their experience flying corporate, small freighters or teaching students. I can tell you through personal experience that nothing “tightens up” your skills like being an IP. You are expected by the student to be perfect. This was the accepted (civilian) path of a Professional Pilot to the airlines.

What has changed? Legacy airlines have outsourced almost half of their flying to regional carriers. These carriers pay so poorly that they cannot attract military or experienced civilian pilots. So they have become the new training ground for the industry, where inexperienced pilots “build time.” Pilots are being hired into jet cockpits to fly passengers, never having flown one. Never having been trained in swept wing, jet powered aircraft. The airlines are not set up to teach flying. They are set up to teach a specific aircraft. The system is set up assuming the Professional Pilot is indeed a Professional Pilot, not a student who has never flown in the clouds or in a jet in his or her life. It is not set up to take a graduating student with 200 hours from a Cessna to the top of the civilian aviation pyramid (swept wing jets). Keep in mind the military students were trained in swept winged jets, and still were not trusted as a “full up round.”

A few years ago, a Regional Jet fell out of the sky onto my home state of Missouri. It was a ferry flight, so the deaths were limited to the pilots. What was wrong with the aircraft? Nothing–that is to say, initially nothing. The crew climbed the aircraft to the top of its operating envelope but didn’t understand mach or transonic air flow–or even basic jet engine operation. They stalled the aircraft, snuffed the engines, and then burnt them up attempting to re-start them at too slow of an indicated airspeed. Their fate was sealed due to a lack of training. This was a fully qualified Captain and First Officer and neither understood the basics of operating a swept winged jet.

So why on earth would the Aviation Universities and Schools want to water down the Federal requirements? In a word: survival. Part 141 Flight Schools are shuttering their doors; the Aviation Universities are barely hanging on. As always, the root cause is money. At my son’s age, my father-in-law looked into getting a pilot license. Total cost for a Private license: 100 dollars. Back then, an airline captain’s pay was on par with a surgeon, CEO, or a lawyer at a top law firm. Flash forward to today: my son just completed Flight A (halfway) for his Private. Total cost: 4,500 dollars (flight time only, not including college courses), which will put it at almost 100 times what my father-in-law would have paid for his. AND an airline captain now makes less than a longshoreman.

The last thing keeping the doors open at flight schools is the promise of a jet at graduation. The schools fear, and rightfully so, that if that goes away, so will all their remaining students.

How bad is it? My son tells me that the instructors are now making fun of the aviation students in his University. Why? Because they are “wasting their time spending a hundred grand for a 20K job”–these are the aviation instructors, by the way.

So what is the solution? Short term, I see no other quick “patch” than the ATP (1,500 hour) requirement. Safety must trump all other concerns. Admittedly, that does not fix the training problem. However, experience will teach a pilot how to keep the aircraft in the heart of the envelope. He becomes more of an operator than Aviator, but for now it will have to do.

The FAA must address the fact that young pilots are moving into swept winged jets never having been trained in them. This is where the Universities and Part 141 Schools could show leadership. They must initiate syllabi that address swept winged jets in theory and operation. They must purchase jet simulators; I realize jet training is beyond the economic realities of any organization other than a Government. Simulators are not. As part of the syllabus they need to train students at the edge of operational envelopes so they understand clearly what happens when that envelope is exceeded. Not a couple of “gee-whiz joy rides”–an intense syllabus.

They must push these simulators to the limit and beyond; over and over again until recovering is instinctual. The entire world’s training programs need to be over hauled. They were designed in the 1930s, when all aircraft were piston powered and had straight wings. It is time to bring training up to date. No more Buffalos.

What is IATA’s (International FAA) solution? IATA’s solution to the shortage of experienced and well-trained pilots is to remove the requirements for training and experience (via MPL). More on that later.

So how does allowing the crews to fly more help lower fatigue in the cockpits? How does that make any sense?

‘The goal of any regulatory change should be to enhance safety.’ Allied Pilots Association (APA).

I agree.

“Pilot fatigue remains the one of the gravest threats to aviation safety, as we have unfortunately seen in recent tragedies such as the Colgan Air accident in Buffalo, New York this past February,” said APA President Captain Lloyd Hill. “Accordingly, we urge policymakers to keep the goal of reducing pilot fatigue foremost in mind as they consider the recommendations of the Aviation Rulemaking Committee.

“Any increase in the amount of time pilots are scheduled to be at the controls in a given duty day will only serve to exacerbate pilot fatigue,” Hill said.

It is hard to argue that fact; the logic alone is laughable.

“In order to make the airlines of America safer we are putting forth a new rule to allow cockpit crews to fly more.”

Huh? Let me point out another severe impact on safety this rule would cause. Many Trans Oceanic crews would go from 3 to 2 cockpit members. The current restriction of 8 hours requires a third pilot to be attached to an International crew flying from say Chicago to London. All three are in the cockpit for takeoff and landing; once at cruise altitude they then rotate ensuring a well rested crew on arrival. The “at rest” crewman has a first class seat; to eat, sleep or just relax in. Newer aircraft, like the 777, actually have a small bunk room for the pilots.

So who is rumored to be behind the rule change? It will surprise you; both the Airline Transport Association (ATA) an organization that represents Management and the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), the largest pilot union in the USA. Why? As always follow the money; for the ATA less crews to pay, for ALPA less days to work. So much for safety.

In its investigations of several fatal airline accidents in recent years, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has repeatedly warned of the dangers of pilot fatigue. Reducing accidents and incidents caused by pilot fatigue is one of the priorities on the NTSB’s “most wanted” list of transportation safety improvements.